Punishment through Forgiveness in Workplace: Rediscovering Kiekegaard’s Knight of Faith in the Abraham Story on Punishment and Forgiveness

ORHERO, Abraham Ejogba¹, OKOLIE, Ugo Chuks²

Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences
Delta State University, Abraka
E-mail: orheabraham@gmail.com¹, E-mail: ugookolie3@gmail.com²

Abstract
Punishment through forgiving is a useful conflict resolution technique that has many advantages in the workplace (for example, for team dynamics, staff members, organizations and dyadic relationships). However, significant conceptual issues have come to light, particularly as academics have started to look at forgiveness in the workplace. This study therefore focuses on punishment and forgiveness that staff members frequently use to overcome their unfavorable reactive attitudes. We conduct a critical review and analysis of the existing literature to identify key conceptual issues that are posing problems for the study of punishment through forgiveness in organizational behavior in order to better understand these problems. According to this study, only a punisher with the personal minds of a Knight of Faith could successfully implement an effective punitive process at work. The story of Abraham served as an example of how God, a Knight of Faith, repaired his relationship with Abraham through punishment and forgiveness. At the individual level, this procedure is comparable to the one used by Nelson Mandela in the South African. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in response to the Enron and WorldCom scandals, is used as an example of how traditional retributive approaches can be more ineffective in achieving reconciliation and reestablishing effective relationships. This study offers fresh, practical understandings of how to facilitate and effectively manage punishment through forgiveness in the workplace. Based on these observations, we concluded that unfavorable reactive attitudes can dominate a staff member’s thoughts and keep them from having positive attitudes and feelings at work. As a result, employees frequently look for ways to effectively and productively get rid of their negative reactive attitudes.

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people they have wronged to restore group trust and effectiveness is curiously absent from any recent research on punishment. It was never suggested in the literature that the process of punishing wrongdoers should include encouraging them to sincerely confess, repent, and be forgiven. When the suggested punishment processes were put into place, harm-doers were more likely to retaliate than to change, which led to mistrust. Altruistic punishment increased cooperation, but harm-doer retaliation counteracted this effect (Thompson & Korsgaard, 2019; Janssen & Bushman, 2008).

From the standpoint of ethical philosophy, Scheler (1973) contends that the goal of punishment was to mend the breach between the harm doer and the person(s) harmed in order to reestablish trust and productive group dynamics. Without reconciliation, wrongdoers who feared punishment would have to be careful, and staff who feared harm or retaliation from wrongdoers who had been punished would have to be cautious as well. This caution reduced genuine cooperation and potential output. However, mending the relationship was not simple. The harm-doer must be seen to be atoning for his or her offense in order for punishment to be justified in order for the victim(s) to understand that harm will “always be repaid with atonement” (Stackhouse, 2019). However, the fundamental goals of punishment were to induce the offender to sincerely acknowledge and atone for the harm committed, with the expectation that the victim(s), upon witnessing the atonement, would be prepared to sincerely pardon the offender. The relationship is restored through the reconciliation of the harm doer and the harmed one, as if no harm had been done, if true repentance and forgiveness were both attained (Paul & Putnam, 2017). Tutu (2000) described a similar procedure used by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to try and make amends with those who had supported apartheid and caused a great deal of harm to others. The TRC offered unqualified forgiveness to those who were willing to acknowledge the harm they had caused, and many of those who did so asked for forgiveness and demonstrated some signs of remorse. Damage-doers and their staffs were often able to mend fences.

In reality, reconciliation is challenging to achieve. People who are willing to compromise on group objectives for their own benefit may not be open to sincere repentance. They may continue to harm others despite receiving punishment, especially if they believe that those they have hurt possibly repeatedly willingly pardon them (Stackhouse, 2019). Even when forgiveness was guaranteed through confession, Tutu (2000) reports that only a disappointingly small percentage of the South African armed forces who had caused harm were willing to come forward voluntarily. According to Scheler (1973), the effectiveness of punishment as a relationship-restoration strategy seemed to depend on the personality of the manager or leader carrying out the punishment process. Even when the history of the wrongdoer made it impossible to expect sincere repentance, this leader might need to punish and forgive repeatedly in the hopes of receiving it. According to Kierkegaard's (1985) analysis of Abraham's relationship with God, there are three possible approaches to punishment depending on the nature of the punisher.
The ‘aesthetic’ did not punish from an ethical standpoint; instead, they were opportunists and constant thinkers. S/he would only be interested in quickly and effectively putting an end to the harm, not in re-establishing the relationship between the harm doer and the person(s) harmed.

The "Knight of infinite resignation," on the other hand, was an ethical person who was dedicated to an ethical principle, such as reconciliation, but who ultimately lost hope and became resigned at his or her inability to apply that principle in that particular situation (Mooney, 1991). Even though s/he would still uphold the ethical principle as a noble ideal, applying it in a specific situation would result in failure. A Knight of Infinite Resignation might take an ethical position in favor of reconciliation and be prepared to repeatedly try to rebuild a relationship. But if it became illogical to think that a specific recidivist could be changed because of repeated wrongdoing, this Knight would give up on the effort to change the person while still remaining committed in general (Stackhouse, 2019). According to Kierkegaard, "with God all things are possible" (Kierkegaard, 1985: 75), so the "Knight of Faith" was driven by an unwavering faith that an ethical principle could be achieved regardless of difficulties, no matter how absurd it seemed to keep trying in a situation where s/he was consistently thwarted (Schacht, 1975; Davis, Hook, VanTongeren, Deblaere, Rice & Worthington, 2015). He or she pursued reconciliation despite what appeared to be hopelessness, defeating the Knight of infinite resignation, without giving up or giving in.

The punishment literature as a whole seemed to assume that a punisher would adopt an aesthetic or a Knight of infinite resignation perspective, with the exception of Tutu (2000) and Hui, Lau, Tsang, and Pak (2011). Either the harm-doer was declared unsalvageable and expelled, or punishment made the harm-doing stop. We've all had trying times at work. It could be the loss of a job, a betrayal by a coworker, a difficult political situation, seeing rudeness, or even the failure to make a necessary sale. We hardly ever discuss forgiveness in relation to art, but it can be crucial to finding fulfillment in our work if we can learn to forgive or improve our forgiveness practices. According to Tutu (2000), decades of research have proven the advantages of forgiving others. Fostering forgiveness in the workplace has been shown to have positive effects on dyadic relationships (such as transgressor reintegration and relationship maintenance), organizations (such as affective organizational commitment, job satisfaction, and decreased turnover intentions), and employees (such as improved physical and psychological health and decreased burnout). According to Brady, Saldanha, and Barclay (2023), forgiveness has actually been acknowledged as a crucially important conflict management tactic that can not only lessen the negative effects of interpersonal conflict but also enhance wellbeing and productivity. In this study, we adopted the stance that, if the leader punishing the offender had the character of the Knight of Faith, it was possible to restore the relationship between the harm-doer and the person(s) harmed. We promote a process of linked punishment, forgiveness, repentance, and reconciliation.
that Nelson Mandela had successfully used at the national level in South Africa at the level of individual behavior within an organization. Additionally, we use the myth of God’s and Abraham’s relationship as a forgiving leader and recalcitrant to illustrate the process.

**Review of Related Literature**

**Punishment: An Overview**

Negative and positive reinforcers must be initially identified through negative and positive reinforcement procedures, respectively, according to Skinner’s (1953) definition of punishment as the response-dependent presentation of a negative reinforcer or the removal of a positive reinforcer. According to Scheler (1973), punishment served two purposes. The person who caused the harm was first made harmless through a process of education. In order to restore organizational effectiveness, the relationship between the harm-doer and the victim(s) was repaired. Scheler (1973) also notes that the typical defense for punishment was retaliation, which is an action to obtain redress of a grievance. Through organizationally approved tit-for-tat retaliation, the harm-doer suffered an equivalent harm. The punisher made sure the victim(s)’ rights were upheld and that the wrongdoer did not gain anything as a result of their actions. Retaliation-based punishment, according to Scheler, has a questionable ethical foundation because it reinforces the legitimacy of doing harm to someone if you have the power to do so. Retaliation also served the purpose of purifying the victim(s), who had been harboring malign moral expectations that the wrongdoer would be forced to atone by accepting punishment and making amends. Organizational retaliation provided the victim(s) with satisfaction and retribution. Here is where most organizational strategies for punishment come to an end. The victim(s) went back to work with the impression that the harm-doer had received justice. The harm caused by the wrongdoer was limited.

However, Scheler (1973) contends that the issue had not yet been fully resolved. The person(s) who were harmed might not have forgiven the person who caused the harm, and no attempt had been made to win their forgiveness. A typical relationship had not been restored as a result. The victim(s) would be distrustful of the harm-doer and fear additional harm or even retaliation from the harm-doer. He or she would harbor mistrust and keep an eye on them, which would reduce the effectiveness of both parties’ future joint efforts. Additionally, there was no attempt to persuade the harm-doer to change his or her ways and the harm-doer may not have felt bad about what they had done. The punishment and threat of further punishment had only served to restrain the wrongdoer. Repentance was defined as having a sincere sense of regret for acting contrary to one’s better judgment, a sincere desire to atone for one’s actions, and a determination to act morally going forward (Zipay, Mitchell, Baer, Sessions & Bies, 2021). According to Scheler (2010), sincere repentance, prompted by the conscience, enables past deeds to be genuinely changed in terms of their significance and value. Through repentance, wrongdoers were able to transform the significance of their previous actions and metaphorically rebirth as new moral beings. A “malicious moral tenor” of false camaraderie emanated from the harm-doer who had not sincere repented,
raising the possibility that additional harm might be likely if the harm-doer could get away with it. The person(s) who were harmed would be on guard against the malicious harm-doer and might be willing to pardon a repentant harm-doer.

Without reconciliation, Scheler (1973) argues that punishment was neither successful nor complete. It was difficult to know whether someone was truly repentant or forgiving because neither could be forced. He goes on to say that the real goal of punishing the wrongdoer was to draw his or her attention to their own moral nature in an effort to make them feel guilty. The desire to be able to forgive oneself was a result of this guilt, which was the worry that the person who had done the harm had not upheld his or her moral standards of himself or herself. The person who caused the harm was more likely to sincerely repent if they felt guilty. The order of forgiveness and repentance was a major issue; if the person(s) who were harmed had already shown genuine forgiveness, the harm-doer was more likely to do so; however, genuine forgiveness was more likely if the person(s) who were harmed saw that the harm-doer was genuinely repentant. Tutu (2000) argued that genuine repentance must come before genuine forgiveness in his discussion of the IRC, but the TRC functioned by unilaterally granting formal forgiveness in order to procure sincere confession, and many of those who did so also appeared to repent, pleading for genuine informal forgiveness from their staffs. Schclcr (1973) and Kierkegaard (Senyshyn, 2009) both proposed that the forgiveness must be contained within the punishment itself in order for it to be independent of the willingness of the person or people who were wronged to forgive. In the hopes that the wrongdoer would be moved to change, the punisher also forgave the offender. The long-term educational process of punishment, however, was based on the moral growth of the wrongdoer (Scholar, 1973). The wrongdoer who was pardoned might not turn around. Before a harm-doer was genuinely moved to seek harmlessness, additional penalties and forgiveness might be necessary. If the person who caused the harm truly regretted their actions and asked for forgiveness from the person or people they had hurt, they were figuratively reborn as a dependable employee, and organizational effectiveness increased.

After being punished and pardoned multiple times, it was noted that a wrongdoer might not truly repent and be genuinely transformed. This observation highlighted the fact that a punisher would lose effectiveness if s/he gave up trying to make amends too soon. The short-term pragmatic viewpoint Kierkegaard referred to as aesthetic was adopted by the majority of punishers (Kim, Kim & Jung, 2018; Mooney, 1991). Aesthetics did not come from an ethical standpoint and made no attempt to either elicit repentance or offer forgiveness, instead concentrating solely on punishing harm that had already been done and attempting to prevent future harm. The Knights of Infinite Resignation were the most likely candidates for punishment from an ethical standpoint. These Knights, in the opinion of Kierkegaard (1985), represented the social system’s public morality, believing that it was their duty to put into practice values that were widely acknowledged.
Rehabilitating wrongdoers, mending strained professional ties, and putting businesses back on track for success were all values. However, there were reasonable bounds. Public morality allowed for an individual recidivist to be discarded while the Knight generally remained committed to the value of rehabilitation if a wrongdoer had to be punished and pardoned repeatedly. Or the resigned Knight might turn passive, allowing harm to continue unpunished, having given up on someone who could not be fired (due to tenure, for example).

The Knight of Faith's character allowed him or her to completely reject the idea that there was a maximum number of successful rehabilitation attempts. He or she would be able to commit fully and steadfastly to the idea of rehabilitation as the highest value and persist in trying to get better long after it seemed pointless to do so. The difference between this Knight and the Knight of Infinite Resignation was not one of optimism. Both Knights concurred that expecting a recidivist to be saved after a certain point is unrealistic. "I nonetheless believe that I shall" (achieve the goal), "specifically on the strength of the absurd, on the strength of the fact that for God all things are possible" (Kierkegaard, 1985: 75). Long after everyone else had given up, the Knight of Faith felt compelled to punish and pardon while still seeking genuine repentance. This Knight was notable for adhering to a personal code of ethics that allowed them to act contrary to popular opinion (Schacht, 1975). Tutu (2000) appeared to be acting as a Knight of Faith in his repeated attempts to persuade P.W. Botha, South Africa’s former president and the main architect of apartheid, to repent. Before Botha could muster the courage to say in open court, "I am sorry that my government's policies caused you pain," he claimed to have approached Botha eight times, seven of which he was rejected (Tutu 2000: 249). Despite criticism from many in the black community for his "kid-glove treatment" of Botha (Tutu, 2000: 248), Tutu persisted because he "felt deeply sorry" (Tutu, 2000: 250) for Botha. Tutu persisted despite opposition from the general public.

Management Research on Punishment
Early studies on punishment produced conflicting results regarding its effectiveness. According to Skinner (in 1938), punishment was ineffective, only had temporary effects, and had negative side effects. Others contend that using punishment as a method of controlling or eradicating allegedly pathological behaviors like alcoholism was effective (Shafa, Harinck, & Ellemers, 2017; Balke, 1965). According to some (Davis et al., 2015; Arvcy & Tvancvich, 1980), punishment was unethical because it was retribution in the sense that wrongdoers were made to pay for their prior bad actions. Others countered that punishment was corrective and not retributive if it was understood to improve future outcomes. According to Foucault (1995), the goal was control and discipline, particularly the intimidation of those who had not yet caused harm. Following Kazadin’s (1975: 33-34) definition that "punishment is the presentation of an aversive event or the removal of a positive event following a response which decreases the frequency of that response," much recent management research on punishment concentrated on themes of control and discipline. The central component of Kazadin’s definition, according to Arvey and Ivancevich (1980),
was a contingency relationship between a defined response and an adverse consequence. Because punishment was intended to change a subordinate’s undesirable behaviors, it was understood to be subordinate-centered by definition.

All of the criteria listed by Arvey and Ivancevich (1980) that they believed affected the effectiveness of punishment had to do with the subordinate and his or her relationship to the punishing superior. It was necessary to impose punishment either as the undesirable behavior was happening or right away after. Instead of being too mild or too intense, it should be of moderate intensity. The person receiving the punishment should be closely and amicably related to the one administering it. After every instance of unfavorable behavior, it should be given consistently, treating different wrongdoers consistently. Subordinates should have access to other desirable responses and be given a clear justification for punishment. Arvey and Jones (1985) tried to demonstrate a positive connection between punishment and either subsequent performance or satisfaction but were unsuccessful. Vicarious punishments had a negligible impact on outcomes in the future, according to Trevino and Youngblood’s research from 1989. Additionally, they stated that studies had produced mixed, conflicting, and inconsistent results, negating the effectiveness of punishment. They asserted that key components of the punishment equation were missing.

Williams (1998) notes in a meta-analysis of 26 earlier findings that there was no statistically significant difference between zero and the correlation between punishment and subsequent employee performance or satisfaction. Williams was unable to determine whether punishment actually had a positive, neutral, or negative effect. Since the meta-analysis could only account for 7% of the model variance, it was determined that there must be moderators affecting punishment effectiveness, but none had been consistently reported. According to Butterfield, Linda, and Gail (1998), punishment can have positive short-term effects, like temporary subordinate compliance, but it can also result in long-term negative attitudes and behaviors, like resentment, hostility, and even sabotage by the punished. In their conclusion, Butterfield et al. (1998) supported Sims’ (1980) earlier claim that superiors should refrain from punishing their subordinates and noted that the subordinate-centered research appeared to show that effective punishment might not be possible. According to Tyler and Blader’s (2005) analysis of supervisor ratings, sanctions appeared to have little impact.

Organizational punishment research, according to Abramson and Senyshyn (2009), should go beyond its subordinate-centeredness. For instance, research on the personality of the harm-doer found that certain personality traits increased the likelihood that a punishment would be viewed as just; if punishment was viewed as just, then performance improved in the aftermath. Performance suffered and the "reformed" wrongdoer was more likely to engage in anti-citizenship behavior in retaliation, such as lying to get the punishing superior in trouble or undermining the efforts of coworkers, if punishment was not perceived as fair.
From the perspective of Jungian psychology, Abramson and Senyshyn (2009) contend that there is a universal punishment archetype that people generally view as fair, and punishments that deviate from the archetype are viewed as unfair and are resisted.

According to Trevino (1992), organizational members other than the punisher and the harm-doer may have an impact on the results of punishment. She hypothesized that other organizational members who knew about the harm-doer’s actions might have experienced pleasure if they thought a punishment was just, or anger if they thought it seemed unjust, and that these reactions might have had an impact on the punishment’s outcome. Accordingly, Butterfield et al. (1998) conducted manager interviews to ascertain the collateral effects of punishment on the coworkers of punished wrongdoers. Managers claimed that punishment served as a useful deterrent to other workers, showing them that they could not get away with bad behavior. Other employees, they claimed, agreed with fair punishment and thought their best interests were being protected. Additionally, they expressed worry about indirect effects on the morale of all workers in the immediate work group of the punished wrongdoer. According to Butterfield et al. (1998), a problematic employee who is not properly handled may have an impact on the morale of the entire organization.

The prevailing attitudes against punishment’s use were justified by management research’s failure to show that it was effective. It was ethically acceptable to administer punishment in the tokenism tradition if it was ineffective in deterring harm-doing or raising victims’ satisfaction. It was expected that the aesthetic would take an unethical stance, focusing solely on stopping subordinate-centered wrongdoing and paying no attention to mending the relationship as a whole. People who took an ethical approach to punishment could do so with an attitude of unending resignation because they knew that their efforts would likely be ineffective in every single case. It appeared more likely that Butterfield et al. (1998) and Williams (1998) were correct that management research on punishment had failed simply because it had excluded important moderating variables from consideration, including forgiveness and repentance, given the success of organizational research in demonstrating the efficacy of punishment.

Altruistic Punishment
According to a behavioral definition, altruism is any action that benefits another person at the expense of the altruist. Though usually associated with giving to those in need, altruism can also occur in the context of punishment. According to evolutionary psychology (F.P.), altruism represents a behavioral universal in the development of cooperation in human interactions that improved humans’ evolutionary “fitness” in particular kinds of recurring situations (Brown, 1991). According to research, there are two different types of altruism. The first type is reciprocal altruism, in which people help needy nonrelatives in the short term in exchange for future reciprocation. These people are what Shinada and Yamagishi (2007) refer to as conditional altruists. When they expected that others would cooperate with them, they acted cooperatively; however, if their
expectations for cooperation were not met, they acted selfishly. People who practice conditional altruism are more likely to use tit-for-tat tactics, giving cooperation in exchange for cooperation while also deviating from cooperation in response to the defection of others. The EP literature defines defection as giving up on working toward common goals in favor of pursuing one’s own interests. To demonstrate that they were excellent alliance partners, costly signalers performed acts of unconditional altruism (Thompson & Korsgaard, 2019; Buss, 2008). These selfless altruists collaborated without expecting exact reciprocity in order to foster friendship and trust. Regardless of whether they were receiving something of equal value, friends would help friends who were in need. Approximately two thirds of participants in laboratory studies were conditional altruists, while a smaller percentage were unconditional altruists and an even smaller percentage always favored their own self-interest (Boyd & Rockenbach, 2004).

Cooperative coalitions had to deal with harm-doing in the form of defection/free-riding that undermined cooperation in order to achieve collective action through altruism. Defection and free-riding were just different expressions of the same self-serving tactic. In an effort to profit from the coalition’s successes without contributing fairly, the free-rider betrayed the trust of the other group members (Buss, 2008). By addressing the issue of defection/free-riding, altruistic punishment aimed to maintain cooperation (Gimis, 2000). Defectors and free riders faced penalties, preventing them from making money off of their uncooperative behavior. Criticism, physical and/or social threats, and exclusion were some of these. Non-cooperators run the risk of becoming the subject of rumors, physical harm, or exclusion from benefits (Barclay, 2006). These punishments were deemed to be altruistic because they required the punisher to expend resources (such as time and energy) on the delinquent, making the decision to punish itself an act of altruism. In spite of the expense and lack of tangible benefits, a strong reciprocator was someone who was prepared to retaliate against selfish people’s unfair behavior (Boyd & Rockenbach, 2004). According to Forgiveness and Punishment research, some people in positions of power refrained from punishing defectors in order to manage their own finances (Barclay 2006). When conditional altruists realized that cheaters might get away with it and that they themselves might successfully defect free ride, their willingness to cooperate was weakened by this refusal to punish.

Altruistic punishment was only effective when strong reciprocators all dealt harsh punishment to defectors/free riders, non-punishers, and those who did not punish non-punishers (Boyd & Richerson, 2004). Altruistic punishment didn’t stop defection/free-riding until after that, and levels of organizational cooperation significantly increased. Even the defections/free riders who were disciplined usually became more cooperative in the future. Strong reciprocators received favorable ratings for being more dependable, group-focused, and respected (Nelissen, 2008). Altruistic punishment’s effectiveness was correlated with its potency. Because the penalties
imposed on defectors and non-punishers were insufficiently severe to render cooperation the more profitable course of action, weak punishment (or no punishment) was ineffective (Shinada & Yamagishi, 2007). Strong punishment was effective if the costs of receiving it were high enough and if it was used as a ‘moralistic strategy’ in which all members of a group punished both offenders and non-punishers (Tamir, Bigman, Rhodes, Salerno & Schreier, 2015). In lab tests, the most cooperative groups were those that allowed the harshest punishment of free riders. According to Shinada and Yamagishi (2007), punishment could be carried out either directly as an immediate result or indirectly as a social consequence through exclusion or isolation that made the defector aware of the social norms and requirements for cooperation. However, severe punishment did not compel all self-serving defectors to cooperate. Tamir et al. (2015) found that when subjects were given the option to join groups that were either governed by self-interest or altruistic punishment and cooperation, the majority eventually chose cooperative groups. However, some people preferred having the option to defect. These select few were ultimately classified as sociopathic or antisocial, and they were excluded from charitable organizations.

Altruistic punishment literature provided justification for aesthetic. The aesthetic would note that altruistic punishment, as a contingency process free of any ethical framework, was effective in reducing or eliminating harm lining and increasing cooperation. The majority of people were conditional altruists who generally or eventually offered assistance in exchange for it. They were motivated to cooperate by altruistic punishment. First, it showed that harm-doers defectors, free riders, and non-punishers would not be permitted to cheat or profit from cooperating dishonest people. Second, conditional altruists were driven by the worry that they would also be punished if they failed to control their own inclination toward self-interest (Thompson & Korsgaard, 2019). The relatively few people who practice unconditional altruism would constantly offer to collaborate. In a cooperative system, they wouldn't need to be punished or threatened with punishment. The system could be made to expel the relatively few recidivist defectors who continued to act in their own self-interest, but given Foucault’s (1995: 108) contention that punishment is directed “above all” at those who have not yet caused harm, or “all the potentially guilty,” it might be advantageous to keep some of them around.

At first glance, the Knight of Infinite Resignation appeared to be an unqualified altruist who held cooperation in the highest regard. Contrary to the aesthetic, s/he was not an opportunist, and his/her value principle served as the foundation of his/her identity, whose loss was completely traumatic (Kierkegaard, 1985). Ultimately, this knight was shown to be a conditional altruist who was prepared to acknowledge that some repeat offenders could not be made to change their ways through altruistic punishment. The Knight of Faith was the epitome of unconditional, unwavering altruism and had unwavering faith in the ability of altruistic punishment to ultimately result in rehabilitation. As a Christian philosopher, Kierkegaard (1985) asserted that the Knight of Faith carried out Luke's (14:26) command to love one's
family above all else: "If anyone comes to me and does not love his father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters, even his own life, he cannot be my disciple." The uncooperative person who was the antithesis of this knight’s belief in unconditional altruism could be “haled” by him. He/she could be punished. Even if it had become absurd to hope for success, it may even have been done mercilessly because of the conviction that the punishment would turn the wrongdoer into someone who could be appeased. Additionally, this knight was not amenable to argument or discussion of his or her intentions and motives (Kierkegaard, 1985). While ethical reasoning called for debate to ensure that punishment was administered with the proper motivations, for the proper causes, and with the correct ends in mind, this knight was silent, clear-cut, and uncompromising.

The Knight remained silent because he or she was unable to defend their actions in light of the common morality or universal ethics. The Knight faithfully upheld a personal moral code that was incommensurate with the morality of the time. The Knight seemed to be terrifying in his/her unwavering resolve and inability to justify it in terms consistent with public morality. However, in the end, the Knight’s only terrifying quality was their commitment to rehabilitation. He or she continued to be essentially a selfless, forgiving, and reconciliatory person who constantly hoped to restore harmony. Her actions made it possible to identify the silent Knight. The Knight was an unconditional altruist if punishment was always followed by forgiveness or if punishment was stopped in favor of forgiveness the moment repentance appeared. According to Tussaint, Worthington, VanTongeren, Hook, Berry, Shivy, and Davis (2018), the punisher was probably an aesthetic who enjoyed punishing others or an ethical person who felt it was their duty if forgiveness was withheld or punishment persisted even after the harm-doer had repented.

In conclusion, Scheler’s (1973) program might be implemented by a Kierkegaardian Knight of Faith character, according to the altruistic punishment literature. S/he would need to be steadfastly committed to strong reciprocation, strong punishment, and unconditional altruism in order to succeed. After initially reading the control and discipline-oriented management literature on punishment, we were disposed to concur with Butterfield et al. (1998) and Williams (1998) that the conflicting results being reported suggested that significant moderator variables were being left out of the die analysis. Repentance and reconciliation were suggested as additional moderators, casting them in the context of altruism and self-interest, by the ethics and altruistic punishment literatures. The moderators we chose didn’t cover the full range of options for them. For instance, every piece of literature we reviewed made the assumption that the person(s) who did the harm also suffered harm. And we talked about this order in our conversation. It would be perfectly reasonable to question whether the harm-doer did so “knowingly” or “unknowingly” and whether his distinction ought to have an impact on results. If a turnaround specialist unknowingly harms a select few people by making them permanently unemployed
while saving a company and many jobs, should there still be some room for repentance and forgiveness? In South Africa under apartheid, white-controlled police and soldiers used deliberate terror tactics against the country's predominately black population. White civilians did not actively support apartheid, but they also did not assist those who were being terrorized. Do harms of omission (the latter) and harms of commission (the former) merit punishment, repentance, and forgiveness on an equal basis? These questions about punishment must wait for additional study and discussion in subsequent papers.

Analysis of the Abraham Story
The relationship between God and Abraham was summed up in five key incidents, which demonstrated what we perceived to be God's Knight of Faith approach to the use of punishment and forgiveness in his effort to reconcile and redeem Abraham. For each critical incident, the descriptive and hermeneutic phases of the interpretation process were combined.

Critical Incident 1: Pharaoh and the First Defection
God certainly seems to be thinking about succession. He wants to found a country, and he thinks Abraham would make a good founding father. God's qualification standard is righteousness, so Abraham had to uphold the highest moral standards in his interactions with both God and other people. Abraham is approached by God, who offers incentives in exchange for his obedience. Abraham will be protected from his enemies and his descendants will become a powerful nation if he simply travels to the land that God will reveal to him. God's understanding seems to be based on reciprocal altruism, offering to assist Abraham in exchange for his cooperation. Additionally, reciprocal altruism is the foundation of Abraham. It appears that he has accepted God's offer and acknowledged God as his leader when he goes, builds alters to God, and invokes God by name.

Due to a famine, Abraham journeys to Egypt with his wife Sarah. Abraham asks Sarah to tell Pharaoh she is his sister in order to deceive him because he fears the king will kill him in order to possess Sarah. God defends Abraham's interests by sending plagues to Egypt until Sarah is returned after Pharaoh takes Sarah as his wife. The implication is that Abraham's self-interest has led him to deviate from his relationship with God, who had promised to protect him, when he acts unrighteously by lying out of fear. Abraham's self-protection is detrimental to their relationship because it undermines their mutual trust and cooperation. The response from God is intriguing. He behaves in an unconditionally altruistic manner, keeps his word, and defends Abraham despite the fact that Abraham caused harm by acting improperly. Abraham doesn't complain, so it seems that God has pardoned him all by himself without any punishment. Abraham returns to Canaan and invokes God's name, which suggests that he has changed his mind. This incident gave the impression that people understood forgiveness and unconditional altruism to be suitable reactions to wrongdoing. It might have been better to wait until a follower had proof that the leader could carry out the agreement's terms before punishing them for disobeying. Abraham behaved as a conditional altruist who might either cooperate or defect through self-interest.
Critical Incident 2: Hagar and Ishmael

In a first covenant, God formally confirms his promises to Abraham. There is a duty on God, but there are no requirements for Abraham. Since his wife is barren, Abraham asks God to keep his promise to provide a son. Through Sarah's slave girl Hagar, God tries to make good on his promise to give Sarah a son. Hagar declines Abraham's offer of a second marriage while also carrying Ishmael. Hagar's treatment of Sarah infuriates Sarah, who complains to Abraham, who then hands Hagar over to Sarah as a punishment. Hagar runs after being "ill-treated." By promising Hagar that her son will have many descendants, God convinces her to go back and accept her predicament. God is angry with Abraham and punishes him by cutting off communication for a period of time. God's first covenant, which places no reciprocal requirements on Abraham's conduct, is an example of unconditional altruism. God desires Abraham to act morally, but He has not made that demand a requirement. Abraham commits an unrighteous act when he subjects Sarah's abuse along with his new wife Hagar and the child that God has given them. Abraham cannot be punished by God for engaging in unrighteous behavior that is not prohibited. On the other hand, it is clear that Abraham's repentance for disbelieving God in the matter of Pharaoh was not sincere because his defection from God's arrangements reveals once more his mistrust of God's promises. It's possible that God is punishing him for his second break from his vow to obey him and submit to his authority. It's also possible that God is more tolerant of harm done to himself than harm done to other people, but he is not tolerant of harm done to others. The punishment was similar to the indirect punishment of social exclusion that strong reciprocators advocated using in the HP literature to impart the value of cooperation.

However, it is evident that God quickly pardons Abraham for lying to Abimelech because God immediately makes good on his promise to provide Abraham with a son. Isaac is born after Sarah gets pregnant. When Sarah sees Ishmael (age 13) and the infant Isaac playing together, she becomes upset at the idea that her son and Hagar will ultimately share Abraham's inheritance. She commands Abraham to expel Ishmael and Hagar into the desert. God answers Abraham's questions and tells him not to be upset. Do as Sarah directs. They nearly perish when Abraham sends Hagar and Ishmael into the desert with just a bag of water. God delivers them, but he takes some time before speaking to Abraham. Although Abraham's wrongdoing in this instance was more subtle, it could be argued that he had broken the covenant requirement to live blamelessly and righteously. By wanting to drive Hagar and Ishmael away in order to further his own self-interest, Sarah was the one who blatantly deviated from her position of innocence. God appeared to give Abraham permission as he attempted to deflect the blame to him. Regardless of whether God approved, the question is whether a man who is truly without sin and righteous would permit his first wife to eject his second wife and her son from his home. Perhaps God gave Abraham permission to sacrifice Ishmael and Hagar to test Abraham's resolve and to see if he had truly changed his ways. God had additional grounds to doubt Abraham's innocence due
to the way he banished Hagar and Ishmael. Abraham could have used his wealth to make sure Hagar and Ishmael received good care while they were in exile, but he chose not to. If, in spite of God's approval, Abraham had resisted the urge to expel Hagar and Ishmael, God would have been pleased with his level of righteousness. If Abraham had treated Hagar and Ishmael with respect and kindness while expelling them, God might have been satisfied. In either scenario, the literature on altruistic punishment made clear that Abraham had a responsibility to punish Sarah for breaking her covenant promise to live blamelessly and morally upright. Abraham deserved punishment simply because he refused to punish the harm-doer and was a non-punisher.

**Critical Incident 3: The Revised Covenant**

God comes back with a new covenant. Abraham must meet a number of requirements under the new covenant in order to be eligible for God's promises. Abraham must conduct himself morally and without error, as if God were always with him. He must consent to having himself and all the male residents of his home circumcised. He has to adopt a new name. He will receive the promises God has already made in exchange, but the amount of land promised has likely been reduced as an additional penalty. Sarah is now a party to the covenant and is required to behave morally and adopt a new name. Abraham accepts the adjustments and appears to be repentant in public, but he secretly rebels against God's promise to provide a son, bowing low before God while giggling to himself that God's promise is illogical because he and Sarah are too old to bear children. Although God later in the story hears Sarah laughing at him when she tries to do so covertly, God pretends not to hear. The new covenant changes God's relationship with Abraham from one of unconditional altruism to one of conditional altruism, indicating that conditions should be placed on repeat offenders of harm. On the other hand, Abraham has offered a new covenant that largely confirms his initial promises, showing that God has forgiven him. The new covenant could be considered a punishment for past behavior but also contained the seeds of forgiveness for that behavior.

**Critical Incident 4: Abimelech**

Abraham and Sarah relocate to Abimelech's kingdom. Out of fear, Abraham has Sarah say that he is her brother rather than her husband in a plot that mirrors their earlier interactions with Pharaoh. In order to protect Abraham's rights, God curses Abimelech after he takes her as his wife. However, there has been a significant shift indicating that God's heart has become harder in light of Abraham's self-interested defections. God steps in to help Abimelech. In the Tharaoh story, God stood up for Abraham as though Pharaoh had done Abraham wrong. Here, God forbids Abimelech from having sexual relations with Sarah because she is Abraham's wife. God acknowledges that he is aware of Abimelech's good faith protests and responds, "Yes, I know that you acted in good faith." Abraham is now being watched over by God in a way that he was not before. Abraham's direct intervention on behalf of Abimelech to lift the curse is another way God punishes him. Although it is unclear whether Abraham changed his ways, he accepts his punishment and holds a ceremony to remove the curse.
Critical Incident 5: Isaac’s Sacrifice

God demands that Abraham sacrifice Isaac as a form of retribution. Abraham complies without objecting, taking Isaac to the designated location, binding him, and sacrificing him there. God intervenes as Abraham prepares to kill Isaac, saying that he can now see that Abraham is a dependable man and rescinding the punishment. In the epilogue, Sarah passes away from old age. Abraham gets many more sons and a lot of wealth when he remarries. Isaac succeeds him as the nation’s father after he passes away. We were led to believe that the Knight of Faith character was a part of a universal framework of understanding in relation to effective punishment by God’s unceasing efforts to punish and forgive in order to facilitate Abraham’s emergence as the righteous man God believed him potentially to be. The myth’s creators, those who ensured its survival over the course of four millennia in three different religious traditions (Judaic, Christian, and Islamic), and we, the interpreters, all seem to have believed that genuine forgiveness and reconciliation would be possible after repeated punishments for wrongdoing. After so many failed attempts, only a Knight of Faith would have persisted in trying to rehabilitate Abraham. Why did Abraham continue to struggle? He appeared to deviate in two situations. When he was afraid, he first turned away from blamelessness and toward self-interest. Fearing Pharaoh and Abimelech, he defected. Second, during the two persecutions of Hagar, he gave up his innocence under the influence of Sarah’s self-interest. Abraham didn’t seem to be able to learn from his past errors. With Abimelech, the error made with Pharaoh was repeated. Hagar continued to be treated unfairly. Abraham’s ability to be rehabilitated by punishments (and incentives) would undoubtedly be discounted by an aesthetic punisher. A Knight of Infinite Resignation would undoubtedly accept the fact that this particular person could not be helped because of his extreme fear and his conflicted loyalty; when a repeat offender kept making the same mistakes, only a Knight of Faith would keep trying to forgive again and again.

Since no punishment and weak punishment had repeatedly failed, God used strong punishment in the fifth incident after learning from his mistakes. Knowing the literature on altruistic punishment, we could assume that this punishment would be more effective. God, however, was personally taking a huge risk by ordering the sacrifice of Isaac. God had previously assured Abraham that he would be the patriarch of a nation, and that Isaac would be the ancestor of this nation. God would be exposed as an unreliable promise keeper with the sacrifice of Isaac. If God was revealed to be unfaithful and unrighteous, how would God be able to enforce the righteousness and faithfulness of his followers? The Knight of Faith was known for this. If the demand for Isaac’s sacrifice represented altruistic punishment, it also served as a sign that God had pardoned Abraham for expelling Hagar and Ishmael by giving him another chance. God risked everything for his faith that Abraham could be saved.

God foolishly gambled on a person who had never before been able to consistently be righteous. Abraham received God's
unwavering trust before his own righteousness and reputation. He gave off a cruel, judgmental vibe. However, God would believe that even though Abraham had always failed and it was absurd to think that he would succeed this time around because “through God anything is possible” (Kierkegaard, 1985: 75), things would finally change. And Abraham would also receive rehabilitation. Being a Knight of Faith, God was able to kill Isaac and jeopardize his own righteousness because, absurdly, he thought Abraham would turn from his sin and the punishment would be lifted. And that’s what happened. Abraham gave his full cooperation, and God regarded it as repentance. God, who is an unwavering altruist at heart, pardoned Abraham and saved Isaac despite the fact that he saw Abraham’s submission as a costly signal. The subsequent birth of Abraham’s additional sons indicated God and Abraham’s reconciliation. Abraham’s defecation from innocence was never again mentioned, and he is still regarded as the founder of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The hermeneutic proposed that this process of “punishment and forgiveness was a feasible approach that one could hope to have applied in one’s own case within the fore-structure of understandings that comprised a universal human nature.

Over 50% of workers are unhappy with their bosses or supervisors, the amount of work they are expected to do, the recognition they receive for their accomplishments, and the culture of their organizations, according to Gallup, a global research and performance management company based in the USA. Dissatisfaction and a lack of engagement are largely caused by high levels of stress at work, particularly from situations involving rudeness, bullying, and harassment as well as being treated like a commodity rather than as a special human and spiritual being. People are frequently plagued by fear of ridicule, punishment, or rejection for mistakes, even when they are unintentional, unintended, and made without malice. This fear can prevent people from performing at their best. In a time of rapid change and rising expectations, managers and leaders must find creative ways to foster success. We think that “forgiveness”—a subject that is rarely discussed in leadership and management circles—can play a significant role in fostering employee engagement, satisfaction, and high performance in businesses all over the world. The goal of business establishment is to maximize profits in order to ensure longevity. Additionally, not-for-profit organizations strive for longevity in carrying out their objectives. As a result, in order to succeed, both profit- and non-profit-oriented organizations need highly engaged staff members. Enhancing teamwork, collaboration, and shared responsibility within the organization is necessary for leaders and managers at all levels to achieve goals and objectives within given deadlines.

According to research, forgiving in order to receive compensation is not true forgiveness, whereas workplaces where leaders and managers place an emphasis on tolerance, understanding, and positivity encourage employees performing well and helping to achieve organizational goals. According to Cameron, Bright, and Caza (2002: 40), organizational forgiveness was “significantly associated with productivity after downsizing as well as lower voluntary employment turnover”. In their study of
small organizations, McCullough, Pargament, and Thoreson (2000) discovered that forgiveness was linked to better morale and satisfaction, more social capital, trust, humanness, and caring relationships. This is especially clear when an organization has suffered harm or unfair treatment, such as in downsizing situations. Additionally, forgiveness inspires workers to perform acts of reconciliation and goodwill toward the offender and to end social estrangement, which improves the effectiveness and productivity of interpersonal relationships in the workplace. In fact, forgiveness is a type of "problem-solving coping strategy" because it brings together opposing parties and preserves the social connection for future interactions. Butler and Mullis (2001) draw the conclusion that it is very challenging to maintain current levels of job performance, let alone improve it, when resentment and other negative feelings exist between coworkers.

**Reflections on the Knight of Faith and Practical Implications**

In summary, Scheler's (1973) program for using punishment and forgiveness to mend the relationship between a harm doer and person(s) harmed is best illustrated by the story of Abraham and God. It also demonstrated the Knight of Faith as a suitable persona for the punisher in a tricky situation. According to Scheler (1973), the goal of punishment is to elicit genuine contrition from the perpetrator and genuine forgiveness from the victim(s). In reality, "it was difficult to know whether a wrongdoer had truly repented or whether a harmed person had truly forgiven." Abraham repeatedly made the errors for which he had already received punishment, making it clear that he had not sincere repented. God, Hagar/Ishmael, Pharaoh, and Abimelech suffered harm. Whether Magar/Ishmael, Pharaoh, or Abimelech ever pardoned Abraham and Sarah is unknown. God pardoned because he demonstrated his continued faith in Abraham by providing fresh chances as a response to each punishment. The lesson for managers was that in order to successfully rehabilitate the repeat offender, they should also extend their own forgiveness. While God is unable to grant Hagar's forgiveness to Abraham, he is able to do so in order to encourage Abraham to begin the process of turning from his sin. The narrative suggested that if recidivists were to be deterred from committing crimes through punishment, extra care would be required. The Knight of Faith made rehabilitation a top priority and an unwavering commitment. S/he was willing to act in ways that others perceived as being outside the bounds of morality, toss aside conventional morality, and even risk his/her own reputation.

The fact that most people want to see wrongdoers punished but don't think much about the consequences of not forgiving or the advantages of eventual reconciliation seems to be a sign of our time. The circumstances surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's (SOX) implementation in response to the financial scandals involving WorldCom and Tyco highlight the inadequacy of this perspective on punishment. This becomes especially clear when the TRC's successes in South Africa are compared to the events surrounding SOX. In our opinion, the SOX strategy was a classic form of retaliatory punishment meant to merely deter wrongdoing in the
future. In order to achieve repentance and reconciliation, the TRC approach was a restorative justice strategy that combined punishment and forgiveness. The largest corporate bankruptcy in US history at the time occurred when Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 2001. In the four years prior to the bankruptcy, shareholders lost $74 billion, and all creditors, suppliers, employees, and shareholders—lost another $67 billion as a result of it. Several senior executives at Enron were later charged with fraud, money laundering, insider trading, and conspiracy, which they allege were the causes of the bankruptcy. The Arthur Anderson public accounting firm, which was charged with falsifying audits and later accused of obstructing justice by destroying documents and emails important to the investigation, supported their actions. As a result, the US Congress passed the SOX Act, which imposes new regulations for public companies' oversight and tougher penalties for wrongdoers. It's interesting to note that WorldCom declared bankruptcy due to dishonest accounting practices just nine days before SOX was signed into law, and the new penalties went into effect right away after SOX became law. WorldCom's bankruptcy was larger than Enron's. The Tyco International scandal occurred in November, 2002. The CEO and former CEO were accused of stealing $150 Million Dollars.

There was no chance for pardon or reconciliation in the cases of the twenty-one Enron executives and spouses charged in connection with Huron's bankruptcy. Eight of the 16 who admitted guilt and appeared to be showing repentance by cooperating to provide evidence also confessed, but they still received prison sentences. Huron's CFO, Andrew Fastow, pleaded guilty and cooperated; however, he was given a ten-year prison term with no chance of parole. His wife, Lea, admitted guilt and received a year in prison for aiding in her husband's income concealment. Even though division manager Kenneth Rice was a prominent witness, he spent twenty-seven months in jail. Chief Accounting Officer Rick Casey initially entered a not guilty plea but later changed his mind and entered a guilty plea. His sentence was seven years. Five executives were found guilty despite their pleas of innocence. Chairman and CEO Kenneth Lay, who pleaded not guilty, was found guilty, and faced a sentence of up to 45 years, but he passed away before being sentenced. Former CEO Jeffrey Skilling received a sentence of more than 24 years. The Arthur Anderson Company was accused of obstructing justice and found guilty. It fought to the US Supreme Court, where the jury's conviction was overturned because of improper jury instructions.

Due to the harsh retributive punishments, lack of forgiveness or reconciliation despite many wrongdoers' attempts to apologise or cooperate, and Arthur Anderson's miraculous escape, it was inevitable that wrongdoers would fight until the bitter end. The SOX-related penalties' escalation amplified that likelihood. This was the situation when Tyco International's CEO Kozlowski and former CEO Swartz were accused of stealing from the company in 2004. Both made a not guilty plea. With allegations that the defendants had tampered with one or more jury members, the first trial resulted in a mistrial. In 2005, a conviction from the second trial resulted in potential sentences of up to 25 years in prison. The final appeal was
rejected by the appellate court in late 2007. Kozlowski maintained his innocence throughout the trial and claimed that the jury's verdict was unfairly biased against him. He said, "I was a guy sitting in a courtroom making $100 million a year and I think a jury sitting there would have to say, "All that money? He must have done something incorrectly; I believe it to be that easy. Dan-Ackman, a Forbes.com commentator from 2005, agreed and asserted that Kozlowski's legal guilt would remain in doubt even after his conviction.

Many adversarial analyses of the costs and advantages of the SOX Act have been produced as a result of the controversy and conflict that these battles have stoked. Since his research suggested that industry compliance costs could reach SI.4 trillion annually, Zhang (2005) argued against SOX. Because SOX compliance was a fixed cost regardless of company size, SOX were accused of lowering the stock valuations of small companies (SEC, undated). A US congressman claimed in 2005 that SOX was "an unnecessary and expensive government intrusion into corporate management" that was to blame for small US companies and foreign companies deregistering from US stock exchanges and registering in London. A lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of SOX was filed in 2006. The US Supreme Court decided to take the case on in 2009. Our main criticism of the SOX response to the Enron and WorldCom scandals as it relates to the Tyco International scandal is that it generated a great deal of controversy without offering any practical solutions to the questions of what constituted wrongdoing or what should be done about it. Because those who intentionally cause harm are not given forgiveness or reconciliation, rational harm-doers have learned to fight until the very end. Battle lines have been drawn, with some members of the public, business leaders, and politicians siding with SOX while others appear to be supporting those who are accused of causing harm but vehemently deny it.

In contrast, after apartheid was abolished and Nelson Mandela, a black president, was elected, the South African TRC was credited with possibly preventing a race war (Tutu, 2000). A white minority ruled South Africa from 1948 to 1994, endorsing and organizing state-sponsored terrorism to rule over the country's black majority. Numerous white-controlled police and soldiers tortured or killed hundreds of black citizens. Black insurgent groups in response tortured or killed black people who they believed to be supporting the white regime. Due to the potential for civil war between the newly freed black majority and the still predominately white police and army, Mandela organized the TRC. The TRC was required to grant formal pardons and amnesty to wrongdoers who came forward and admitted their crimes. Harm-doers who refused to confess would face legal action. The government of Nelson Mandela decided it did not want to follow what it referred to as the Nuremberg trial model, in which the World War II Allies tried and executed German war criminals. According to Tutu (2000), this process led to long-lasting animosities, and the Germans continued to harbor resentment despite having come to terms with it after the war because "the victors, as it were, could kick the vanquished even as they lay on the ground." Retributive justice, according to Tutu, could have
been obtained by the black majority, but it would have been a Pyrrhic victory because a civil war would have destroyed South Africa. “We had to strike a balance between the needs of accountability, justice, stability, peace, and reconciliation” (Tutu 2000: 23).

Restorative justice is primarily concerned with “the healing of breaches, (he redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships, a seeking to rehabilitate both the staff and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he has injured by his offense” (Tutu, 2000: 55). Mandela chose restorative justice over punitive justice. These objectives struck us as being strikingly similar to Scheler’s (1973) program for reconciling punishment, repentance, and forgiveness. And earlier in the paper, despite much criticism from his own black community, we argued that Tutu himself was a model of the Knight of Faith for his repeated attempts to finally win Botha’s repentance. In general, Tutu believed that the TRC and the restorative justice plan were only a partial success. The TRC looked into allegations of criminal activity among representative staffs. When sufficient proof was found to convict a wrongdoer, s/he typically came forward to ask for pardon, confess, and get absolved. These confessions had to be complete in order to receive forgiveness; otherwise, it would be withheld. As a result, confessions frequently implicated other people, who later came forward and made their own confessions. In the end, Tutu was happy that many had come forward and received forgiveness but disappointed that a sizable portion of the armed forces had been able to obstruct the proceedings due to a lack of strong evidence. Many victims were also disappointed because they objected to their wrongdoers receiving pardons without being held accountable. Tutu contends, however, that many of the wrongdoers were divorced by their wives and held up to public criticism, and that the humiliation of having to confess in open meetings covered by the media and broadcast to the nation constituted punishment. In light of the current IJS Supreme Court challenge, it was clear from comparing the SOX response to the TRC that SOX represented retributive justice and a Pyrrhic victory that had not yet been achieved. The worst part is that its unyielding retribution against even those who wanted to confess and repent has forced any person accused of harm doing to light to the end. It has imposed significant costs on US industry, led to the exodus of both small US companies and foreign companies from the US. The TRC process, in contrast, was an example of restorative justice because it allowed for confessions of crimes, forgiveness to be freely given, and repentance to be freely offered. Best of all, it put an end to conflict and division because it allowed the opposing sides to make some progress toward reconciliation.

Exciting new opportunities to examine how people forgive, including how forgiveness can be aided and hindered in organizations, are presented by viewing forgiveness through an emotion regulation lens. Importantly, the literature on emotion regulation has identified a variety of emotion regulation techniques, including, but not limited to, acceptance, mindfulness, and suppression. We contend that these emotion control techniques can be important facilitators of the forgiving
process. These techniques are crucial because they have the power to affect both one's present and desired emotions. By altering one's desired emotions (i.e., emotion goals) or current emotion levels, for instance, cognitively reappraising a transgression (e.g., identifying situational factors that may have created the transgression rather than blaming the transgressor) may facilitate forgiveness. Although some emotion regulation techniques can help people forgive, others have the potential to cause misregulation, or "regulating in ways that are harmful rather than helpful." This is in line with the notion that the process of forgiving someone can be challenging and fraught with setbacks. With this in mind, there is a lot of room to investigate the efficiency of various emotion regulation techniques, including whether or not particular techniques are effective.

Conclusion
God argues that Abraham was his man from the beginning of the Abrahamic narrative because he was obedient and righteous. Paul noted in Romans that God would count as righteous a person who would release the wrongdoer, pardoning unlawful acts even when no recompense had been provided. In other words, God believed that Abraham was capable of acting similarly to God from the beginning. Despite Abraham's behavior, God never wavered in his determination that he would grant him success and forgave him even when there was no sign that he had truly repented. God's faith was ultimately vindicated. Through God's determination, the morally dubious and self-centered Abraham finally attained righteousness and greatness. Perhaps the tale served as a commentary on human nature with significant implications for corporate settings. If Abraham was the best that God could find, there was little hope that businesses would be able to find managers, leaders, or employees who were more admirable. Because even the best employees were likely to be conditional altruists and likely to harm when they put their own interests ahead of cooperation, everyone was fully capable of doing harm, and a punishment process that did not reconcile would lead to much mistrust within organizations, it was crucial to recognize the value in prescriptions for re-establishing moral relationships between harm doers and the person(s) harmed. Distrust would cause care, and care would cause effectiveness to decrease. They lacked the patience to elicit sincere repentance or offer limitless forgiveness because the majority was either aesthetics or Knights of Infinite Resignation, the best conditional altruists. Only those who were committed to reconciliation as Knights of Faith could continue to faithfully punish and forgive. Long after other punitive measures had failed, only they could keep holding out the absurd hope that the recidivist would eventually repent and the strained relationships would be patched up. Given that everyone has the potential to cause harm and to work, they might be worth the risk. One of the most crucial conflict-management techniques in organizations is forgiveness. By conceptualizing forgiveness as a unique instance of emotion control, we offer a way forward that takes into account major problems with the current state of the field and opens up exciting new directions for future investigation that could further our theoretical understanding. To
effectively manage and promote forgiveness in the workplace, organizations, managers, and employees must have access to evidence-based practical guidance. We hope that researchers studying forgiveness and emotion control will build on this framework to advance our understanding and practical capacity to encourage forgiveness in the workplace.

Implications for Modern Management

Our conceptualization not only encourages evidence-based interventions and practices but also offers insights and advice for managers, employees, and organizations. As mentioned above, many workers find it difficult to forget. Self-reflection can be based on an understanding of the significance of forgiveness processes involving both positive and negative emotions, as well as the functions of current emotions and emotion goals. This may then help to pinpoint the areas of difficulty and the techniques that are most likely to improve emotion regulation. Additionally, this knowledge can be useful for both workers and those who support workers (such as managers, HR professionals, and employee assistance programs). These understandings of the forgiveness process, for instance, can help leaders decide how to support their staff members during and after a conflict. Employers may gain from choosing workers who have strong emotional regulation abilities because they may aid in productive conflict resolution within the company. Furthermore, since servant leadership is concerned with supporting employees in their worries and struggles on a daily basis, it should be promoted in organizations that want to create forgiving environments that are strong.

Adding to the aforementioned, forgiveness can be improved through training initiatives. For instance, many businesses have already incorporated training programs that can help employees develop their ability to control their emotions (like mindfulness training). Organizations may be able to improve forgiveness and foster climates of forgiveness in their workplaces by connecting these skills to conflict resolution and forgiveness. Furthermore, given that temporality can affect how people perceive and react to events, training programs that encourage participants to concentrate on the present or future (rather than the past) may also improve forgiveness (e.g., by motivating them to use techniques to elicit the desired emotions). Evidence-based protocols may be added to current training programs or provided separately (for example, by offering workshops on conflict resolution or forgiving others) as they are validated. Additionally, organizations may profit from incorporating these insights into their dispute resolution procedures in order to resolve disputes and/or to assist staff in realizing how to move on after the formal processes are finished.

When forgiveness is viewed through the prism of emotion regulation, the ability to examine the effects of desired emotions on the processes of forgiving opens up; for instance, researchers can examine how desired emotions, such as someone’s desire for forgiveness, influence the coping mechanisms they use to manage their emotions and the effectiveness of those coping mechanisms in facilitating forgiveness. In some circumstances, it might be preferable for people to have realistically desired emotions (such as a
goal of having only mildly negative emotions toward a transgressor) as opposed to idealistic or inspirational desired emotions (such as a goal of experiencing none at all). This is due to the possibility that strategies that are inappropriate for the reality of the workplace context (such as when there is a high likelihood of future offenses) may be prompted by emotionally unrealistic goals. In other circumstances, however, aspirational levels of the desired emotions may encourage cognitive reappraisal or sense-making that may aid in reframing an offense and thereby aid in forgiving.

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